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WHAT HUMAN RIGHTS LAW COULD DO: LAMENTING 
THE ABSENCE OF AN INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS 
LAW APPROACH IN BOUMEDIENE & AL ODAH
Fiona de Londras*
In December 2007 the U.S. Supreme Court heard oral arguments in its latest Guantánamo Bay 
cases, Boumediene v. Bush and Al Odah v. United States. Interestingly, the argumentation 
offered in this litigation was almost exclusively domestic—international human rights law did 
not feature in spite of its capacity to add signiﬁcantly to the weight and persuasiveness of the
arguments petitioners’.  In respect of both the geographic scope and the content of constitutional 
standards, international human rights law has a well-developed body of jurisprudence that, 
this Article argues, ought to have been advanced by counsel for the petitioners.  This Article 
both exposes the potentially signiﬁcant international human rights law arguments that could
have been advanced, and explores some possible reasons for the marginalization of this 
body of law. The Article concludes that this strategic decision on the part of counsel for the 
petitioners robbed the U.S. Supreme Court of an opportunity to assert the relevance of human 
rights law to the “War on Terrorism,” and to expand on the relationship between international 
and domestic constitutional standards and, for those reasons, is to be lamented.
***
It was my pleasure to prepare this Paper for a conference honoring the work of David 
Kretzmer, whose commitment to human rights has resulted in a body of work as deep 
and thought-provoking as it is broad and insightful.  This honor was only matched by 
the pleasure of ﬁnally meeting David at the conference; a pleasure that I have since
enjoyed once more and which I hope to have on many future occasions. 
***
* Lecturer, UCD School of Law & UCD Institute of Criminology, Dublin, Ireland.
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I. Introduction
Guantánamo Bay and the rights of those detained there are among the most enduring 
controversies in the “War on Terrorism.”  One of the primary areas of concern has 
been the apparent unavailability of habeas corpus to those detained as “enemy 
combatants” until the cessation of hostilities; a point in time that even the United 
States’ administration accepts may be impossible to identify.1  On December 5, 2007, 
the U.S. Supreme Court heard oral arguments in the latest cases to assert habeas 
corpus rights for these detainees—–Boumediene v. Bush and Al Odah v. United States, 
the decision in which was handed down in June 2008.2  Interestingly, the arguments 
presented to the Court both orally and in the written submissions gave scant attention 
to international law and none at all to international human rights law (IHRL).  This 
is surprising when one considers that IHRL has a well developed and contextually 
appropriate body of jurisprudence to be drawn on in relation to the two primary issues 
in the case: the geographical reach of rights-protecting provisions, and the essential 
elements of habeas corpus or adequate alternative. 
Not only does IHRL have a well-developed jurisprudential corpus that would have 
served a prudential purpose in this case by adding another string to the petitioners’ 
bow, but it is also an appropriately formulated body of law to rely on when assessing 
the appropriate level of individual rights in the context of counter-terrorism.  Unlike 
many domestic legal systems—including the United States’3—IHRL has an in-built 
emergency structure comprising derogation processes that offers a clear delimitation 
of allowable “security-motivated” action. IHRL not only offered additional authority 
for use by counsel for the petitioners in Boumediene, but also represents principles 
and doctrines of law that have been designed to ensure an achievable, sustainable, 
proportionate and appropriate balance between individual rights and the security-
1 For an acceptance of the difﬁculty of identifying the cessation of hostilities in the “War on
Terrorism” see, e.g., the Press Brieﬁng of Tony Snow, June 12, 2007 when the following exchange
took place: Reporter: “How do you declare an end to the War on Terror?”;  Snow: “I don’t know,” 
available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2007/06/20070612-3.html.
2 Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. ___ (2008).
3 For an argument in favor of an “emergency constitution” see BRUCE ACKERMAN, BEFORE THE NEXT 
ATTACK: PRESERVING CIVIL LIBERTIES IN AN AGE OF TERRORISM (2006); for an analysis of “models 
of accommodation” in times of crisis see FIONNUALA NÍ AOLÁIN & OREN GROSS, LAW IN TIMES OF 
CRISIS: EMERGENCY POWERS IN THEORY AND PRACTICE (2007).
564 THE ABSENCE OF AN IHRL APPROACH IN BOUMEDIENE & AL ODAH
prerogatives of the state.4  As outlined in Part III below, there is no reason in law 
for the exclusion of IHRL argumentation—in fact, by analogy with the principles 
for consideration of comparative law in constitutional interpretation, reference to 
international human rights would have been entirely appropriate in this case.5
This Article outlines the ignored jurisprudence and laments its exclusion from 
the litigation, particularly since this was not required by domestic law and denied 
the Supreme Court the opportunity to consider the appropriate relationship between 
constitutional and international rights protecting norms in times of conﬂict.  Part II
offers a background to the Boumediene and Al Odah litigation, including outlining the 
shortcomings in the review mechanisms available to those detained in Guantánamo 
Bay.  Part III outlines the human rights law arguments that, it is proposed, ought to 
have been made in this case.  These arise in two contexts—ﬁrst, in relation to the extra-
territorial reach of human rights law which, it is argued, could substantiate a claim for 
the application of constitutional rights to Guantánamo Bay; second, in relation to the 
content of habeas corpus which, it is argued, could have been advanced as indicators 
of the adequacy of a provided review mechanism to satisfy the constitutional right to 
habeas corpus or “adequate alternative.”  Part IV then considers a number of reasons 
for the omission of IHRL, and shows that none of these possible motivations are 
convincing.  The Article concludes (Part V) that the failure to argue IHRL in this 
latest Guantánamo Bay case is a missed opportunity to establish a more harmonious 
concert between the rights of suspected terrorist detainees under U.S. constitutional 
law and IHRL. 
II. A Little Background to Boumediene and Al Odah
This is not the ﬁrst time that the Supreme Court had been asked to decide on the
availability of habeas corpus to suspected terrorists detained in Guantánamo Bay.6 
4 For a critical perspective on the emergency-ready design of international human rights law see 
Conor Gearty, Reﬂections on Civil Liberties in an Age of Counter Terrorism, 41 OSGOODE HALL L. 
J. 185, 202-204 (2003).
5 Diane Amann, ‘Raise the Flag and Let it Talk’: On the Use of External Norms in Constitutional 
Decision Making, 2(4) INT’L J. CON. L. 597 (2004).
6 Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004); Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006).
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Such litigation is particularly contentious because one of the primary motivations for 
the use of Guantánamo Bay in the light of the attacks on the World Trade Centre and 
Pentagon on September 11, 2001 was its perceived immunity from oversight by the 
federal courts by means of habeas corpus.7  This perception can be primarily traced 
back to the World War II decision of Johnson v. Eisentrager,8 in which the Supreme 
Court held that aliens captured and detained outside of the United States in relation to 
offenses conducted outside of the United States, had no entitlement to access either 
constitutional9 or statutory10 habeas corpus procedures.   Relying to a great extent on 
this precedent, the United States government resolved to detain non-citizen suspected 
Al Qaeda members in Guantánamo Bay and, initially, did not afford any review 
processes to those detainees by which they could challenge the lawfulness of their 
detention.  The ﬁrst of the Guantánamo cases—Rasul v. Bush11—saw the Supreme 
Court assert a statutory habeas corpus entitlement on the part of these detainees,12 and 
the second—Hamdan v. Rumsfeld13—essentially recognized the right of Congress to 
amend the habeas corpus statute in order to strip federal courts of this jurisdiction to 
as full an extent as desired.14  Neither of these cases, however, reached the question 
of the constitutional habeas corpus entitlements of Guantánamo Bay detainees—the 
issue that confronted the Supreme Court in the Boumediene litigation.15 
A. The Challenge
Boumediene & Al Odah concerned 37 non-U.S.-citizen detainees held in Guantánamo 
Bay for approximately six years.  While all of these detainees had been through the 
Combatant Status Review Tribunal (CSRT), introduced as a result of the Hamdi16 and 
7 Rasul v. Bush, id., 497-99 (Scalia J., dissenting); See also PHILIPPE SANDS, LAWLESS WORLD 144 
(2005).
8 339 U.S. 763, 777-78 (1950).
9 U.S. Const, art. I, §(9)(2) “The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be suspended, 
unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public safety may require it.”
10 28 USC § 2243 (2004). 
11 Rasul v. Bush, supra note 6.
12 See, e.g., David L. Sloss, Rasul v. Bush, 98 AM. J. INT’L L. 788 (2004).
13 Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, supra note 6. 
14 See, e.g., Peter J. Spiro, Hamdan v Rumsfeld, 100 AM. J. INT’L L. 888 (2006).
15 Boumediene v. Bush; Al Odah v. United States, supra note 2.
16 Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004).
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Rasul17 decisions and considered in some depth below,18 the detainees claimed that 
they were in fact entitled to habeas corpus or an adequate alternative under the U.S. 
Constitution, and that the CSRT and judicial review thereof did not constitute such an 
“adequate alternative.”19  The challenge, therefore, involved two primary questions: 
(a) does the U.S. Constitution extend to Guantánamo Bay, resulting in those detained 
there being constitutional rights-bearers?; and (b) what constitutes an “adequate 
alternative” to habeas corpus?20  Counsel for the petitioners based their argumentation 
on these matters largely on leasehold and sovereignty, in relation to the ﬁrst question,21 
and on the common law of habeas corpus in relation to the second.22 
The naval base in Guantánamo Bay in which the petitioners and other suspected 
terrorists are or were held is under the leasehold ownership of the United States by 
virtue of a perpetual lease formed through two treaty agreements between the U.S. 
and Cuba.23  This lease can be terminated by the United States only and, although it 
recognizes Cuba’s continuing sovereignty over the base, expressly grants the U.S. 
exclusive jurisdiction over the base.  Thus, as counsel for the petitioners argued, any 
activities undertaken in the base—even by a Cuban national who might be working 
there—are governed by U.S. federal law and not actionable in Cuban courts.24  As a 
17 Rasul v. Bush, supra note 6.
18 Infra Part II (B).
19 Constitutional jurisprudence makes it clear that the right to habeas corpus secured in art. I. §(9)(2), 
see supra note 9 [the Suspension Clause] is satisﬁed by the provision of an adequate alternative, 
Swain v. Pressley, 430 U.S. 372 (1977).
20 There is also some consideration of whether Sect. 7 of the Military Commissions Act of 2006 
constitutes an unconstitutional suspension of habeas corpus in violation of Article I (9)(2) but 
lower federal courts have already found the statute not to suspend constitutional habeas corpus 
for the lack of express suspending words; a convincing argument that is likely to prevail in the 
Supreme Court—Hamdan v Rumsfeld, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 89933 (Dec. 13, 2006).  For 
that reason, this element of the litigation is not considered in detail in this Paper although it is 
considered in Fiona de Londras, Hamdan v Rumsfeld, 54 NETH. INT’L L. REV. 539 (2007). 
21 Brief for Petitioners Al Odah et al., at 16-19 available at http://www.mayerbrown.com/public_
docs/probono_AlOdah_Abdah.pdf [hereinafter Brief for Petitioners Al Odah et al.]; Brief for 
Petitioners Boumediene et al., at. 16-17 and n.16 available at http://www.mayerbrown.com/
public_docs/probono_Boumediene_Petitioners_Merits.pdf [hereinafter Brief for Petitioners 
Boumediene et al.] (both sites last visited June 25, 2008).
22 Brief for Petitioners Al Odah et al., supra note 21, at 31-39 (in which alleged inadequacies of the 
available review are frequently assessed by reference to the traditional, common law operation of 
habeas corpus); Brief for Petitioners Boumediene et al., supra note 21, at 18-33 
23 Lease of Lands for Coaling and Naval Stations, U.S.-Cuba,  art, III Feb. 23, 1903, T.S. No. 418; Treaty 
Deﬁning Relations with Cuba, U.S.-Cuba,  art. III, May. 29, 1934, 48 Stat. 1683, T.S., No. 866.
24 See Oral Transcript, Boumediene v. Bush; Al Odah v. United States, Dec. 5, 2007, 28-32, available 
at http://www.supremecourtus.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/06-1195.pdf.  
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result, the base itself is, to paraphrase Kennedy J. in the Rasul judgment, essentially 
an unincorporated territory of the United States25 and, under the Insular Cases 
jurisprudence,26 therefore subject to at least some constitutional governance, particularly 
in relation to fundamental individual liberties such as the right to habeas corpus.  It 
is worth noting, however, that although what I class “the territorial approach”27 to 
constitutionalizing Guantánamo was largely successful in this case28 and is based in 
the familiar municipal conceptions of property, leasehold, and territorial jurisdiction, 
it carried with it a number of risks.  Robert Chesney sums these risks up well when 
he writes: 
[m]ight the extension of a robust form of judicial review to 
Guantánamo detainees cause the government to rely more than 
it otherwise would on detention facilities in Afghanistan and 
elsewhere, which are not only less secure and convenient, but 
also less transparent and less likely to be subjected successfully to 
litigation of any kind?29 
The territorial approach relied upon by counsel for the petitioners in this case, 
although successful in the instant proceedings, may thus endanger future detainees 
and deter the government from transferring future detainees to Guantánamo Bay or 
any other areas outside of the United States over which the U.S. may have analogous 
perpetual leasehold proprietorship.30  As considered below,31 a “effective control and 
25 Rasul v. Bush, supra note 6, at 487. 
26 See, especially, Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244 (1901).  For general commentary on The Insular 
Cases see, e.g., John Burgess, The Decisions of the Supreme Court in the Insular Cases, 16 POL. 
SCI. Q. 486 (1901). 
27 For a full consideration of this “territorial approach” see Fiona de Londras, In the Shadow of Hamdan 
v Rumsfeld: Habeas Corpus Rights of Guantánamo Bay Detainees, 17 IRISH CRIM. L. J. 8 (2007).  For 
a political science consideration of whether Guantánamo Bay can be described as being within the 
United States see, e.g., Amy Kaplan, Where is Guantánamo?, 57 AM. Q. 831 (2005). 
28 Boumediene v. Bush; Al Odah v. United States, supra note 2, 38-39 (noting the particular leasehold 
status of Guantánamo Bay).
29 Robert Chesney, Judicial Review, Combatant Status Determinations, and the Possible 
Consequences of Boumediene, 48 HARV. INT’L L.J. ONLINE 62, 67 (2007).
30 It does not, in fact, appear that there are any places over which the United States has an analogous 
leasehold proprietorship at the moment.  This is reﬂected by the comment of Justice Bader
Ginsburg in the oral argumentation in Rasul that “I think Guantánamo, everyone agrees, is an 
animal, there is no other like it” – Oral Transcript, Rasul v. Bush, Apr. 20, 2004, 51, available at 
http://www.supremecourtus.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/03-334.pdf.
31 Infra Part III (A).
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authority” approach, based on international legal principles of extra-territoriality, 
appears to offer more promise of ensuring that individuals are detained as ‘enemy 
combatants’ only when there is an evidence-based belief of involvement in terrorism 
that requires detention as a matter of national security, and when this belief can be 
effectively challenged, through an adversarial process.
In relation to the argument that the current review system was “inadequate,” 
counsel for the petitioners argued that habeas corpus as it was in 1789 allowed for 
substantive and effective review that was not afforded to the petitioners, and without 
which the current system could not fulﬁl the constitutional requirement of habeas 
corpus or adequate alternative.32  To this end, counsel was not only ignoring a vast 
body of jurisprudence from IHRL on the essential elements of effective review,33 but 
also conceding that constitutional standards are not to be informed by contemporary 
international developments.  Given that the operation of the detention facility in 
Guantánamo Bay is said to be required by and structured in the light of a novel and 
substantially “new” set of circumstances,34 the decision to argue adequacy almost 
exclusively by these 1789 standards appears short-sighted.  Without doubt, the en 
vogue nature of originalism in constitutional interpretation in the United States 
warranted attention to such a line of argument,35 but concentration thereon to the 
exclusion of IHRL standards deprived the litigation of valuable and contextually-
appropriate conceptions of habeas corpus drawn from international institutions, 
considering habeas corpus for suspected terrorists in times of crisis.36  As considered 
below, arguments drawing on international legal doctrine and principle would have 
afforded signiﬁcant “added value” to those actually advanced and ought not to have
been ignored by counsel.
32 Oral Transcript, Boumediene v. Bush; Al Odah v. United States, supra note 24, at 39. 
33 Infra Part III (B).
34 See, e.g., Press Conference by President Bush, July 7, 2006, available at http://www.whitehouse.
gov/news/releases/2006/07/20060707-1.html. 
35 Put relatively simply, the originalist position is that the text of the Constitution binds the future 
and the Constitution means what it meant when originally introduced in 1789.  The debate 
between originalists and non-originalists rages in U.S. periodicals, but an excellent overview of 
both positions and critique of originalism itself is offered in DENNIS GOLDFORD, THE AMERICAN 
CONSTITUTION AND THE DEBATE OVER ORIGINALISM (2005).
36 Infra Part III (2).
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37 By means of comparison, the Israeli Incarceration of Unlawful Combatants Law, 5762-2002, S.H. 
(2002) allows incarceration where there is reasonable cause to believe that a person being held 
by the state authorities is an unlawful combatant and that his release will harm state security.  In 
this case, however, the incarceration order comes before a judge within 14 days for the detainee to 
challenge the lawfulness of the order and, by implication, the detention.
38 Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, supra note 16. 
39 See supra note 6. 
40 Pub. L. No. 109-148, 119 Stat. 2739, 2740 (codiﬁed at 10 USC § 801(2005))  
41 Memorandum from Gordon England, Secretary of the Navy, Enc. (1), § B, July 29, 2004 (regarding 
Implementation of Combatant Status Review Tribunal Procedures for Enemy Combatants 
detained at Guantánamo Bay Naval Base, Cuba) [hereinafter England Memorandum], available 
at http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Jul2004/d20040730comb.pdf, (last visited  June 25, 2008).
42 Memorandum from Paul Wolfowitz, Deputy Secretary of Defence, to the Secretary of the Navy, 
July 7, 2004 (regarding ‘Order Establishing Combatant Status Review Tribunal’) [hereinafter 
Wolfowitz Memorandum]. Section a. available at http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Jul2004/
d20040707review.pdf (last visited June 25, 2008).
43 See Wolfowitz Memorandum, id. at section e.
44 England Memorandum, supra note 41. 
B. The Available Review
It was originally the case that those detained in Guantánamo Bay had no mechanism 
to have the lawfulness of their detention there reviewed: they were classiﬁed as
“enemy combatants” by the Executive, which then asserted a right to detain them 
“until the cessation of hostilities.”37  As a result of both Hamdi38 and Rasul,39 however, 
it became clear that some review mechanism would have to be afforded to suspected 
terrorist detainees held in Guantánamo Bay.  While the Supreme Court in both of these 
cases accepted that the Executive could, in fact, detain “enemy combatants” until the 
hostilities had ceased or until they no longer posed a threat to the security of the 
United States, the Justices also stressed the importance of ensuring that those detained 
have some mechanism of review available to them.  As a result, CSRTs, which are 
now primarily regulated by the Detainee Treatment Act 2005,40 were established.41
All those who appear before CSRTs are presumptively classiﬁed as enemy
combatants,42 and the function of the review is merely to establish whether or not 
that classiﬁcation is still appropriate, which in turn deﬁnes whether or not continued
detention is justiﬁable.  These reviews, which take place in Guantánamo Bay, are
non-adversarial and administrative in nature.  The tribunal itself comprises three 
commissioned ofﬁcers, who are to be “neutral,”43 although they are not military 
judges and only one of them is required to be a lawyer.44  These members must then 
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determine whether “the preponderance of evidence” supports the conclusion that the 
detainee is an enemy combatant, with evidence adduced by the government enjoying 
a rebuttable presumption of being genuine and accurate.45  The tribunal is “not bound 
by the rules of evidence such as would apply in a court of law,”46 but rather, can 
consider any evidence deemed to be both relevant and helpful to the matter under 
consideration.47  Although both parties may present evidence, and indeed the Tribunal 
is to consider evidence from both sides, there is no obligation to disclose evidence as 
between the parties, which compounds the plight of a detainee who is without counsel, 
and whose information ﬂow is largely determined by whatever mail receipt rules are
approved in his particular case.  The detainee may call witnesses at his tribunal, but is 
not guaranteed that those witnesses will be secured for the proceedings as appearance 
is limited to those who are “reasonably available,”48 affecting not only the capacity to 
examine military ofﬁcers who may have been involved in the capture, detention and
interrogation of the detainee, but also individuals who may have relevant information 
but whose exact whereabouts or even full name might not be known to the detainee. 
The essentially illusory nature of the right to call, examine and cross-examine 
witnesses is borne out by the empirical study of Denbeaux and Denbeaux who found 
that the government never relied on testimony at a CSRT hearing.49 
Detainees are given only limited notice of the review date,50 frequently do not 
understand that this is a review as opposed to another form of interrogation,51 and 
are not provided with legal counsel.  Rather than being entitled to the services of a 
lawyer, detainees are provided with a “personal representative” whose chief role is 
to “assist the detainee in connection with the review process.”52  However, the role 
of the representative may not be clear to the detainee. Section C obligates informing 
the detainee that the representative is not the detainee’s advocate.53 Moreover, the 
45 Id. at sect. G(11).
46 Wolfowitz Memorandum, supra note 42, at section G(9).
47 Id.
48 England Memorandum supra note 41, at section F(6).
49 Mark Denbeaux & Joshua Denbeaux, No-Hearing Hearings—CSRT: The Modern Habeas 
Corpus?, SETON HALL PUBLIC LAW RESEARCH PAPER NO. 951245 (2006), available at 
 http://law.shu.edu/news/ﬁnal_no_hearing_hearings_report.pdf.
50 The review must take place within 30 days of the detainee being given notice—England 
Memorandum, see supra note 41, at section d.
51 See Denbeaux & Denbeaux, supra note 49, at 16.
52 See Wolfowitz Memorandum, supra note 42 at section c. 
53 See England Memorandum, supra note 41, at enclosure (3) 3.
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representative is a military ofﬁcer,54 and in reality the role of the representative is to 
visit with the detainee and read a list of the accusations against him on the basis of 
which the detainee is being held.55  As this is generally the same list of accusations as 
the detainee has responded to in numerous interrogations, the blurred lines between 
interrogation and review are arguably further distorted in the eyes of the detainee by 
the involvement of the personal representative, exacerbating the difﬁculties detainees
face in making out a viable case before a CSRT.
The decision of a CSRT is subject to limited review in the U.S. federal courts, at 
which point in a proceeding the detainee will have access to legal representation.  The 
Detainee Treatment Act confers jurisdiction on the Court of Appeals for the District 
of Columbia “to determine the validity of any ﬁnal decision of a Combatant Status
Review Tribunal that an alien is properly detained as an enemy combatant.”56  This 
does not allow for a substantive hearing on the merits, however.  Rather, the Court of 
Appeals is statutorily limited to considering whether the CSRT in question made its 
determination in a manner “consistent with the standards and procedures” speciﬁed
for CSRTs, and whether the application of these standards is consistent with “the 
Constitution and laws of the United States” to the extent to which those laws are 
deemed applicable.57  This is clearly an extremely restrictive review, particularly if the 
Court of Appeals were to ﬁnd that the Constitution did not apply—as was the status 
quo ante at the time of the Supreme Court argumentation in Boumediene.  The fact 
that the Military Commissions Act 2006 itself attempts also to preclude reliance on 
international law as a source of rights in these reviews of the CSRT decisions, makes 
the inadequacy of the review mechanism even more evident.58
This procedure—CSRT with limited review in the federal courts—was the 
sole review mechanism available in statute to those detained in Guantánamo Bay. 
Although the Supreme Court found that federal courts have statutory habeas corpus 
54 See Wolfowitz Memorandum, supra note 42, at section c.
55 See supra note 50.
56 Detainee Treatment Act, supra note 40, at section 1005 (e)(2)(a).
57 Id. at section 1005 (e)(2)(c)
58 Military Commissions Act 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, § 7(a), 120 Stat. 2600, 2635-36 (2006). 
Section 5 of the Act provides that:
 No person may invoke the Geneva Conventions or any protocols thereto in any habeas 
corpus or other civil action or proceeding to which the United States, or a current or former 
ofﬁcer, employee, member of the Armed Forces, or other agent of the United States is a
party as a source of rights in any court of the United States or its States or territories.
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jurisdiction over Guantánamo Bay, Congress subsequently stripped that jurisdiction 
in the Detainee Treatment Act59 and replaced it with the process described above. 
When the Supreme Court then held, in Hamdan,60 that the 2005 statue did not strip 
jurisdiction over habeas corpus petitions lodged and pending at the time it was 
introduced, Congress introduced Section 7 of the Military Commissions Act 200661 
which provides—in unequivocal terms—that federal courts have no jurisdiction 
over habeas corpus petitions lodged by enemy combatants and that this “jurisdiction 
stripping” provision has retrospective effect.62  Thus, the Boumediene litigation 
represented an important challenge to the combined decision of Congress and the 
Executive to exclude the judiciary from determinations as to detention in the War on 
Terrorism.  If, on the one hand, the Supreme Court afﬁrmed the lower court ruling
under review,63 (i.e., that Section 7 is an effective stripping provision and there is 
no federal habeas corpus) then Guantánamo Bay detainees would have been reliant 
solely on the statutory processes outlined above.  If, on the other hand, the Court 
found that the Constitution applies in Guantánamo, it would then proceed to assess 
the adequacy of these statutory proceedings to act as a constitutionally acceptable 
alternative to habeas corpus.
III. Human Rights Law Arguments
Following an exchange of various applications and petitions by both parties, in which 
the arguments outlined above, are made out, the U.S. Supreme Court heard oral 
arguments in Boumediene on Dec. 5, 2007.  Of primary interest in this Article, is the 
distinct absence in both the documentary submissions and the oral argumentation, of 
reference to international human rights standards.  The transcript of the oral hearings 
59 Detainee Treatment Act, supra note 40, at Sect 1005(e).
60 See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, supra note 6.
61 See supra note 58.
62 Section 7 amends Section 1005(e)(1) of Public Law 109–148, 119 Stat. 2742, to read:
 No court, justice, or judge shall have jurisdiction to hear or consider an application for a 
writ of habeas corpus ﬁled by or on behalf of an alien detained by the United States who
has been determined by the United States to have been properly detained as an enemy 
combatant or is awaiting such determination.
63 Boumediene v. Bush, 476 F.3d 981 (D.C. Cir. 2007).
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features no reference to IHRL whatsoever.64  International law fares only marginally 
better in the documentary briefs submitted by the parties, where once more IHRL 
features not at all.  The original Brief for Petitioners Al Odah et al.65 focuses on 
international law in respect of cessation of Guantánamo Bay66 and the concept and 
deﬁnition of “enemy combatant.”67  The Brief for Petitioners El-Banna et al.68 invokes 
international law only inasmuch as it refers to the Geneva Conventions.69  The Brief 
for Petitioners Boumediene et. al.70 similarly invokes only international humanitarian 
law (both the Geneva Conventions and customary international law) when considering 
whether the United States has lawful authority to detain the particular detainees at all, 
particularly in relation to the concept of direct participation in hostilities.71  The only 
reply brief to make any meaningful reference to international law is Reply Brief for 
Petitioners Al Odah et al.72 which states, that “CSRTs are not contemplated or governed 
by international law and are not sufﬁcient under international or U.S. law to justify
detention without meaningful judicial review in territory under the exclusive, and 
effectively permanent jurisdiction of the United States”73 but does not specify whether 
this conclusion is drawn from international humanitarian law, IHRL, or both.
The absence of sustained IHRL argumentation is striking given the fact that 
the United States ratiﬁed the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
(ICCPR)74 in 1992 and has not entered any War on Terrorism related derogations, and 
given the potential for principles of IHRL to play an exceptionally effective persuasive 
role in relation to both the “reach” of U.S. constitutional standards and the content of 
those standards.  This is not to say that IHRL would have trumped constitutional 
or, indeed, legislative standards in the case.  The argument of this Article is that 
IHRL offered a rich source of argumentation as to the possible interpretation of the 
64 See supra note 2.
65 Brief for Petitioners Al Odah et al., supra note 21.
66 Id. at 16-23.
67 Id. at 38, 41.
68 Available at http://www.mayerbrown.com/public_docs/probono_El-BannaBrief_Final.pdf, (last 
visited June 25, 2008).
69 Id. at 48-49.
70 Brief for Petitioners Boumediene et al., supra note 21. 
71 Id. at 37-42.
72 Available at http://www.mayerbrown.com/public_docs/probono_Reply_Brief_al_Odah.pdf (last 
visited June 25, 2008).
73 Id. at 6.
74 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), U.N. Doc. A/6316, 
Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171, entered into force Mar. 23, 1976 [hereinafter ICCPR].
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Constitution and its geographic scope.  This is particularly so given the common 
objectives of constitutional bills of rights and IHRL—neither body of law intends to 
act as a “suicide pact” or to unconscionably tie the hands of the state in times of crisis 
or strain; rather, both are ﬂexible, accept the need for more restrictive measures than
normal in times of strain, and recognize that individual rights ﬂowing from individual
dignity and humanity (and not from status,75 citizenship76 or law-abidingness) ought 
only to be infringed to the extent strictly necessary in a time of crisis or emergency.  In 
constitutional terms this is particularly evident from the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision 
in Matthews v. Eldridge77 in which the Court outlined a calculus by which public good 
can be balanced against individual rights in order to identify the scope of entitlements. 
This calculus was cited by O’Connor J. in Hamdi.78  In international law, human rights 
law has long emphasized the need for international legal standards to take prevailing 
circumstances into account both where derogations have been entered and where they 
have not been entered but where the prevailing circumstances require some additional 
ﬂexibility on the part of IHRL.79 Given these commonalities, recourse to principles of 
IHRL in Boumediene and Al Odah would have been appropriate.
A. Extra-Territorial Application
States’ obligations to comply with IHRL extend beyond their immediate geographic 
territory and to all areas within their effective power or control.  This part of the Article 
exposes some of the key decisions at U.N. and regional level outlining this principle 
and identiﬁes a common concern with ensuring that human rights treaties fulﬁl their
75 In Hamdi the Supreme Court found that the petitioner had a habeas corpus right notwithstanding 
his status as a suspected terrorist ”enemy combatant,” see Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, supra note 16. 
International institutions have consistently held that one’s status as a suspected terrorist is not 
relevant to one’s human rights entitlements, see jurisprudence considered infra in Part III (B). 
76 U.S. Constitutional law clearly acknowledges that non-US citizens are entitled to habeas corpus, 
see INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289 (2001).  IHRL has a consistent and unwavering commitment to 
rights ﬂowing from one’s humanity and without any reference whatsoever to citizenship—see, 
e.g., Preamble to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, U.N. GAOR, 3rd 
Sess., 1st. plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/810 71 (Dec. 12, 1948) [hereinafter UDHR].
77 Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
78 See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, supra note 16, at 529.
79 Fiona de Londras, The Right to Challenge the Lawfulness of Detention: An International 
Perspective on U.S. Detention of Suspected-Terrorists, 12 J. CONFLICT SEC. L. 223 (2007).
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protective purpose as the underlying rationale for this (admittedly exceptional) extra-
territoriality. 
Article 2(1) of the ICCPR deﬁnes the scope of the covenant in the following
terms:
Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to respect and 
to ensure to all individuals within its territory and subject to its 
jurisdiction the rights recognized in the present Covenant, without 
distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, 
political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth 
or other status.
The terms of Article 1 of the First Optional Protocol to the ICCPR are also worthy of 
note in this relation.  Under this provision signatory parties recognize the competence 
of the Human Rights Committee to consider communications “from individuals subject 
to [the state’s] jurisdiction who claim to be victims of a violation” of the ICCPR by 
that state.80  The expressed terms of Article 2(1) thus provide that individuals subject 
to a state’s jurisdiction are rights-bearers under the Convention. This is of particular 
signiﬁcance in the context of Guantánamo Bay given the United States’ “exclusive
jurisdiction” over the base.81  On a positivistic level, therefore, there seems little scope 
for dispute that Guantánamo detainees are “subject to [the US’] jurisdiction.”  The 
Human Rights Committee has, however, gone beyond such apparently positivistic 
declarations of jurisdiction in assessing the nature of states’ obligations under Article 
2(1), and has found that the provision “means that a State party must respect and 
ensure the rights laid down in the Covenant to anyone within the power or effective 
control of that State Party, even if not situated within the territory of the State Party” 
and that “[t]his principle also applies to those within the power or effective control of 
the forces of a State Party acting outside its territory, regardless of the circumstances 
in which such power or effective control was obtained.”82  This stated principle in 
General Comment No. 31 reﬂects established authority in the jurisprudence of the
Committee itself.
80 First Optional Protocol to the ICCPR, supra note 74.
81 Supra note 23.
82 General Comment 31, The Nature of the General Legal Obligation Imposed on States Parties to 
the Covenant, ¶ 10 U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.13, (May 26, 2004).
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The U.N. Human Rights Committee considered the meaning of the phrase “within 
its territory and subject to its jurisdiction” in a number of complaints against Uruguay,83 
many of which involved claimants who had not been within the territorial jurisdiction 
of Uruguay at the time of the alleged violation.84  In respect of these cases the Human 
Rights Committee’s approach is perhaps best encapsulated in this extract from its 
decision in Lopez Burgos v. Uruguay85 and Celeberti de Casariego v. Uruguay86 to 
the effect that “the reference in [Article 1 of the Optional Protocol] is not to the place 
where the violation occurred, but rather to the relationship between the individual 
and the State in relation to a violation of” Convention rights.87  Importantly legal 
citizenship is of no consequence to a state’s obligations towards individuals.88  This 
appears therefore to be a reading of “jurisdiction” that is intends to give full effect to 
the Convention rights; that recognizes that the purpose of the Convention requires an 
extra-territorial approach in cases where the behaviors in question occur in the context 
of a relationship between state and individual that requires Convention protection. 
Thus, the Human Rights Committee has concluded that the Convention applies to 
Israel in its behavior in and in relation to the Palestinian Occupied Territories89 and to 
the United States in its behavior in and in relation to those detained at Guantánamo 
Bay, Cuba.90
83 See Masslotti and Baritussio v. Uruguay, Communication No. 25/1978 R.6/25, U.N. Doc. Supp. 
No. 40 (A/37/40) at 187 (1982); Viana Acosta v. Uruguay, Communication No. 110/1981; Montero 
v. Uruguay, Communication No. 106/1981, U.N. Doc. Supp. No. 40 (A/38/40) at 186 (1983); 
Lopez Burgos v. Uruguay, Communication No. 52/1979, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/OP/1 at 88 (1984); 
Celeberti de Casariego v. Uruguay, Communication No. 56/1979, No. R.13/56, U.N. Doc. Supp. 
No. 40 (A/36/40) at 185 (1981).  
84 See, e.g., Montero v. Uruguay; Lopez Burgos v. Uruguay; and Celeberti de Casariego v. Uruguay, 
supra note 83. 
85 Supra note 83.
86 Id.
87 Lopez Burgos v. Uruguay, supra note 83, ¶ 12.1-12.3; Celeberti de Casariego v. Uruguay, supra 
note 83, ¶ 10.1-10.3. 
88 But c.f. Individual Opinion of Christian Tomuschat in Lopez Burgos v. Uruguay and Celeberti de 
Casariego v. Uruguay, supra note 83.  It should be noted that some elements of this individual 
opinion are subject to criticism including Tomuschat’s focus on the citizen and nonsensical 
distinction between “wilful and deliberate violations” of the ICCPR and “objective impediments 
to implementation.”  A good review of the opinion is available in Orna Ben-Naftali & Yuval 
Shany, Living in Denial: The Application of Human Rights in the Occupied Territories, 37 ISR. L. 
REV.  17, 71-74 (2003-2004).
89 See Concluding Observations of the Human Rights Committee: Israel, U.N. Doc. CCPR/CO/78/
ISR (Aug. 21, 2003).
90 See, e.g., Concluding Observations of the Human Rights Committee: United States of America, 
U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/USA/Q/3/CRP.4 (July 28, 2006). 
577Fiona de Londras ISR. L. REV. Vol. 41 No. 3, 2008
91 American Declaration on the Rights and Duties of Man (1948), art. II,  O.A.S. Res. XXX, adopted 
by the Ninth International Conference of American States (1948), reprinted in Basic Documents 
Pertaining to Human Rights in the Inter-American System, OEA/Ser.L.V/II.82 doc.6 rev.1 at 17 
(1992). 
92 Resolution XXII of the Second Special Inter-American Conference in 1965 resolves 
 to authorize the Commission to examine communications submitted to it and any other 
available information, so that it may address to the government of any American State 
a request for information deemed pertinent by the Commission, and so that it may make 
recommendations, when it deems appropriate, with the objective of bringing about more 
effective observance of fundamental human rights.  
 Rio de Janeiro, Nov. 1965, Final Act. OEA/Ser. C/I.13, 32-4
93 American Declaration on the Rights and Duties of Man, supra note 91, art. 1(1).
94 The Haitian Centre for Human Rights v. United States, Case No. 10.675, Report No. 51/96, Inter-
Am.C.H.R.,OEA/Ser.L/V/II.95 Doc. 7 rev. at 550 (Mar 13, 1997). 
Article II of the American Declaration on the Rights and Duties of Man91 does 
not include any express jurisdictional scope, primarily because it is not a treaty and 
was not originally intended to be applied to the member states of the Organisation 
of American States; rather it was intended to be a non-binding document expressing 
aspirational standards for achievement in the region.92  It was not until 1965, when 
the Inter-American Commission was given authority to hear individual complaints 
alleging human rights violations, that the Declaration was applied to the member 
states.  In contrast the American Convention on the Rights and Duties of Man contains 
a jurisdictional clause: “The States Parties to the Convention undertake to respect the 
rights and freedoms recognized herein and to ensure to all persons subject to their 
jurisdiction the free and full exercise of those rights and freedoms …”93
Article 1(1) is clearly distinguishable from Article 2(1) of the ICCPR because it 
makes no mention whatsoever of “territory” in setting out the jurisdictional scope of 
the treaty.  While the practice of deﬁning jurisdiction by reference to territory might
suggest that the treaty is primarily applicable to those within the territory of a member 
state, the case law of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights clearly demonstrates 
a broader scope for the treaty.  In the ﬁrst place, the Court has established that state
actors can be liable under the Inter-American human rights regime for the effect on 
people outside of their territorial jurisdiction of actions done inside of the territorial 
jurisdiction.  Thus, in the Haitian Interdiction Case94 the Commission found the 
United States liable for interfering with Haitians’ attempts on the High Seas to seek 
safe haven in third countries.  Although the United States argued that the prohibition 
on refoulement would apply only where asylum-seekers had reached the territory 
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of a member state, the Commission referred to Soering v. United Kingdom95 and its 
progeny in the European Court of Human Rights in ﬁnding the United States had
breached the Declaration.  In addition, all those who come within the effective control 
of a member state are protected by the Inter-American regime even if the relevant 
events take place outside of a state’s territorial jurisdiction.96
Article 1 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) obliges member 
states to “secure to everyone within their jurisdiction the rights and freedoms”97 
contained within the Convention and has espoused a particularly rich jurisprudence 
on the extra-territorial scope of the Convention. While it has long been accepted 
that Article 1 lays down the principle that the Convention’s application is primarily 
territorially limited, 98 early jurisprudence from the European Commission on Human 
Rights provided that states have an obligation under the treaty to secure the rights of all 
those under their actual authority and control including those outside of the respondent 
state’s territorial space.99  Article 1 jurisprudence now suggests that there are three 
categories of circumstance in which the Convention might have extra-territorial 
effect:100 situations engaging the principle of non-refoulement, cases in which a state 
has effective control over a territory outside of its own territorial jurisdiction;101 and 
situations where individuals come under the somewhat incidental control of a state 
—very often in an administrative manner—although that state may not have control 
over the territory in question.102
95 Soering v. United Kingdom, 11 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 439 (1989).
96 See, e.g., Coard v. United States, Case 10.951, Inter-Am. C.H.R., Report No. 109/99, OEA/Ser.L./
V/II.106, doc. 3 rev. (1999);  Armando Alejandre Jr et. al. v.. Cuba, Case 11.589, Inter-Am. C.H.R., 
Report No. 86/99, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.106 Doc. 3 rev. at 586 (1999).  Inter American Commission 
on Human Rights, 41 I.L.M. 532 (2002) (on which see Brian Tittemore, Guantánamo Bay and 
the Precautionary Measures of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights: A Case for 
International Oversight in the Struggle Against Terrorism, 6 HUM. RTS. L. REV. 378 (2006).
97 Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, art. 1, Sep. 3, 1953, 
213 U.N.T.S. 222.
98 Soering v. United Kingdom, supra note 95, at 86.
99 See, e.g., X v. Federal Republic of Germany (1965) 8 HUM. RTS. Y.B. 158; Hess v. United Kingdom 
(1975) 2 D.R. 72; Cyprus v. Turkey (1975) 2 D.R. 125; X & Y v. Switzerland (1977) 9 D.R 57.
100 The categorization of these cases reﬂects that used by Michal Gondek in Extraterritorial Application 
of the European Convention on Human Rights: Territorial Focus in the Age of Globalization?, 52 
NETH. INT’L L. REV. 349 (2005).
101 Loizidou v. Turkey, App. No. 15318/89, 23 Eur. H.R. Rep. 513 (1997); Cyprus v. Turkey (2001) 
11 BHRC 45; Cyprus v. Turkey, 2001-IV Eur. Ct. H.R., at ¶ 95-99. 
102 See, e.g., Stocké v. Germany, Eur. Ct. H.R. 25, at 166 (1991). 
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In spite of the reasonably solid classiﬁcation of “extra-territoriality” principles
into these three genera of cases, the Grand Chamber did not consider the meaning of 
the jurisdiction clause in Article 1(1) of the Convention until Banković v. Belgium103 
in 2001.  In this case the Court considered whether member states who were involved 
in the aerial bombing of Radio Televizije Srbije in April 1999, had Convention-based 
responsibilities towards residents of the area and concluded that no jurisdictional link 
between the complainants and the respondent state could be established. 
The Court reiterated the principle that the Convention is primarily territorial so 
that extra-territorial application of the Convention is a strictly exceptional occurrence. 
In essence this element of Banković was a mere restatement of existing principle; the 
Court had laid down the same principle in its early Soering104 decision and is perfectly 
in-keeping with the inclusion of a “territory clause” in Article 1.  As the pre- Banković 
jurisprudence suggested, the exceptional circumstances in which the Convention 
could be applied extra-territorially fall into three categories: 
[The Court’s] recognition of the exercise of extra-territorial 
jurisdiction by a contracting state is exceptional: it has done so when 
the respondent state, through the effective control of the relevant 
territory and its inhabitants abroad as a consequence of military 
occupation or through the consent, invitation or acquiescence of 
the government of that territory, exercises all or some of the public 
powers normally to be exercised by that government.105
Very controversially, the Court then held that the Convention applies within a 
quite-strictly-delineated espace juridique comprising the territories of the member 
states of the Convention.106  If, as happened in Cyprus v. Turkey,107 individuals were 
in an area in which they enjoyed Convention rights, then the assumption of authority 
by another member state would not result in a gap in protection: rather continuity 
of protection could be assured by means of holding the new authority state liable 
103 (2001) 11 BHRC 435; see Banković v. Belgium 12 Eur. Ct. H. R. 353 (2001), Banković v. Belgium, 
2001–XII Eur. Ct. H.R. 333 (GC).
104 Soering v. United Kingdom, supra note 95.
105 Banković v. Belgium, supra note 103, at 71.
106 Id. at 80.
107 Cyprus v. Turkey, supra note 101.
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for the Convention in spite of the fact that this state would be acting outside of its 
own territory.  The Court has subsequently handed down decisions that suggest that 
the espace juridique principle from Banković may not in fact be as expansive as it 
ﬁrst appears. In Öscalau v Turkey108 for example, the Court found the respondent 
state bound by the Convention in respect of an individual over whom it had authority 
and effective control, notwithstanding the fact that the acts impugned occurred in 
Nairobi airport.  The Banković decision notwithstanding, therefore, there remains a 
clear extra-territorial scope for the ECHR albeit in limited situations.
If the major human rights treaties have at least some extra-territorial application 
inasmuch as they can be enforced against a state for its activities outside of its 
own territorial borders, this may suggest something important about the nature of 
rights-protecting provisions and the structural requirements for their effective 
implementation.  While the U.N. Human Rights Commission has not expanded 
signiﬁcantly on the rationale for its application of the ICCPR extra-territorially, there
are some indications in its opinions and concluding observations that suggest that the 
principle is necessary in order to give effect to the rights protected by the Convention. 
Effective implementation of rights is clearly within (if not in fact central to) the 
object and purpose of human rights instruments and this can therefore be classiﬁed
as a purposive approach to the reach of the Convention. The purposive approach is 
far more clear-cut in both the Inter-American and European regimes, however.  In 
both the Coard109 and Armando Alejandro110 cases the Inter-American Commission 
endorsed extra-territorial application of the human rights regime on the basis of the 
object and purpose of the Declaration and Convention. 
Perhaps the most express example of the purposive approach to the physical 
reach of IHRL can be found in the Article 1 jurisprudence of the European Court 
of Human Rights.  In Soering the Strasbourg Court referred to the Convention’s 
“special character as a treaty for the collective enforcement of human rights and 
fundamental freedoms” and to the “object and purpose of the Convention” in ﬁnding
that the United Kingdom had a responsibility under Article 3 to ensure, to the extent 
possible, that they did not transfer the complainant to a place where his Convention 
rights may be violated.111  Equally in Banković the Court reasserted its longstanding 
108 Öcalan v. Turkey, Eur. Ct. H.R. 46221/99 (2005). 
109 See Coard v. United States, supra note 96, at 467.
110 Id.
111 See Soering v. United Kingdom, supra note 95, at 87.
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purposive approach by asking “[What is] the ordinary meaning to be given to the 
phrase “within their jurisdiction” in its context and in the light of the object and 
purpose of the convention.”112  Post-Banković case law shows that the Court has not 
abandoned “object and purpose” based approaches to the scope of the Convention.  In 
Ilaşcu v. Moldova and Russia113 the Court afﬁrmed the principle that the Convention
can apply to military operations, even where the state gains only temporary overall 
control of all or part of another state.114  In Öcalan v. Turkey115 the Court further held 
that the Convention could be applied when the complainants are within the “authority 
and control” of a member state, even if geographically the events complained of take 
place outside of the espace juridique of the Convention.
Thus, the concept that a state would be bound by its obligations where it is in 
effective control of an area—even if that area is not within the state’s territorial 
jurisdiction—is now well established in IHRL.  The rationale for this principle is 
the effective implementation of the objects and principles of those human rights 
instruments; namely, the effective protection of individual rights against unlawful, 
unjustiﬁable, and disproportionate state action that undermines and violates individual
dignity.  In this respect one’s citizenship, behavior, race, religion, etc., do not disqualify 
one from the enjoyment of rights, although they may result in a re-balancing of rights 
in relation to a particular category of person if that is justiﬁed by the circumstances.  So
committed is IHRL to the universality of its application, that some rights—such as the 
right to be free from torture—have been elevated to the status of jus cogens rights116 
and others—such as the right to challenge the lawfulness of one’s detention—have 
been deemed non-derogable by implication within discrete human rights systems.117 
If, as outlined above, constitutional bills of rights also have at their heart the object 
and purpose of limiting state action irrespective of the characteristics of the individual 
at bar, then a principle of extraordinary extra-territorial application would be apposite 
and the omission of this line of argumentation from Boumediene is perplexing.
112 See Banković v. Belgium supra note 103, at 51.
113 Ilaşcu v. Moldova and Russia, (2004) 17 BHRC 141.
114 Id.
115 Supra note 108.
116 On the prohibition of torture as a jus cogens norms see, e.g., Prosecutor v. Furundžija, International 
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, 2002, 121 INT’L L. REP. 213 (2002).
117 See Advisory Opinion on Habeas Corpus in Emergency Situations, Inter-American Court of 
Human Rights, 11 Eur. H.E. Rep. 33 (1987).
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B. The Content of the Habeas Corpus Right
The second step in this case involved challenging the current review procedures 
operating in Guantánamo Bay, for even if the petitioners convinced the Court that 
they are constitutional rights bearers, the petitioners’ constitutional habeas corpus 
entitlements would be fulﬁlled if the Court could be satisﬁed that the available review
processes are an “adequate alternative” to habeas corpus.118  In this context, again, 
IHRL offered the petitioners a source of law and principle concerning the vital elements 
of the right to challenge the lawfulness of one’s detention and its operation in times 
of emergency that could have been drawn upon in order to identify the benchmarks 
against which the current review processes could be assessed. 
All international human rights documents protect the right to be free from arbitrary 
detention119 and many of them expressly protect the right to challenge the lawfulness 
of one’s detention.120  International law’s concern with detention is not directed toward 
prohibiting detention per se; the international legal order recognizes that detention 
of individuals may be required in certain circumstances.  Its concern, rather, is with 
the prevention of arbitrariness in detention.121  One of the primary mechanisms of 
ensuring that one is not arbitrarily detained is the capacity to challenge that detention 
before a court, primarily achieved in common law jurisdictions through habeas corpus 
118 Swain v. Pressley, supra note 19.
119 UDHR, supra note 76, art. 3; ICCPR, supra note 74, art. 9; American Declaration of the Rights 
and Duties of Man, supra note 91, art. XXV; American Convention on Human Rights, art. 7, 
July. 18, 1978, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123 [hereinafter ACHR]; Convention for the Protection of Human 
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, art. 5, Sep. 3, 1953 213 U.N.T.S. 222; Arab Charter on Human 
Rights, art. 5, Sep, 15, 1994, reprinted in 18 HUM. RTS. L.J. 151; African [Banjul] Charter on 
Human and People’s Rights, art. 6, June 27, 1981, reprinted in 21 I.L.M. 58; Convention on 
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms of the Commonwealth of Independent States, art. 5, 
May 26, 1995 [hereinafter CIS].
120 ICCPR, supra note 74, art. 9(4); Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms, supra note 119, art. 5(4); ACHR, supra note 119, art. 7(6); CIS, supra note 119, art. 
5(3).
121 Arbitrariness in this context can be taken to mean detention that is unjust or incompatible with the 
principles of justice and human dignity see, e.g., Human Rights Committee, Views of the Human 
Rights Committee under article 5, paragraph 4, of the Optional Protocol to the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (A v. Australia Complaint No. 560/1993), U.N. Doc. 
CCPR/C/59/D/560/1993 (Apr. 30, 1997).
 For more on international’s law concern with preventing arbitrary deprivations of liberty see, e.g., 
NIHAL JAYAWICKRAMA, THE JUDICIAL APPLICATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS LAW: NATIONAL, REGIONAL AND 
INTERNATIONAL APPROACHES, Chapter 13 (2002).
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procedures.  Article 5(4) of the ECHR provides that detainees “shall be entitled to take 
proceedings by which the lawfulness of his detention shall be decided speedily by a 
court and his release ordered if the detention is not lawful.”  Article 9(4) of the ICCPR 
and Article 7(6) of the American Convention on Human Rights (ACHR) are expressed 
in almost identical terms, while Article 5(3) of the Convention on Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms in the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) requires 
that a detainee “shall be entitled to have the lawfulness of his arrest or detention 
examined by a court.”122  This suggests that a judge or court ought to be able to assess 
compliance with procedural requirements in domestic law; the reasonableness of the 
suspicion that forms the basis for the detention; and the legitimacy of the purpose 
of detention.  Habeas corpus petitions normally allow for these three levels of 
assessment.123  In order to satisfy international legal obligations, detainees must have 
the opportunity not only to lodge a petition but to have the lawfulness of their detention 
substantively reviewed,124 by reference to both domestic and international law.125 
In the course of elaborating upon this element of international law, the various 
enforcement mechanisms have outlined a number of required elements of such 
processes. It is clear that what this right requires will very much depend on the 
circumstances of the particular case;126 thus where detention results from an 
administrative decision, the detainee must have recourse to a court, but where the 
detention results from a court procedure, the opportunity to challenge its lawfulness 
can be rolled into the court decision provided the court procedure observes and 
respects the rights of the individual.127 Although international law requires that a 
122 Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms in the Commonwealth of Independent 
States [hereinafter CIS] (May 25, 1995).
123 Earlier drafts of the ICCPR expressly refer to habeas corpus but these references were removed 
out of deference to non-common-law legal systems (U.N. Doc. A/2629).
124 Human Rights Committee, Views of the Human Rights Committee under the Optional Protocol 
to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (Smirnova v. Russian Federation 
Complaint No. 712/1996), U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/81/D/712/1996 (Aug. 18, 2004).
125 Human Rights Committee, Views of the Human Rights Committee under the Optional Protocol 
to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (Baban v Australia Complaint No. 
1014/2001), U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/78/D/1014/2001 (Sept. 18, 2003).
126 For example, in Boumar v. Belgium, 11 Eur. Ct. H.R. 1 (1989), the European Court of Human 
Rights held that “the scope of the obligation…is not identical in all circumstances or for every 
kind of deprivation of liberty,” id. at ¶ 60.  This matter is considered more fully in Fiona de 
Londras, The Right to Challenge the Lawfulness of Detention: An International Perspective on 
U.S. Detention of Suspected-Terrorists, 12 J. CONFLICT SEC. L. 223, 246-47 (2007).
127 De Wilde, Ooms & Versyp v. Belgium, 1 Eur. H.R. Rep. 373, ¶ 76 (1971).
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detainee would have the opportunity to mount a challenge before a “court,” what 
this actually requires is that the challenge would be brought before a tribunal in 
which “the procedure followed has a judicial character and gives to the individual 
concerned guarantees appropriate to the kind of deprivation of liberty in question.”128 
The authority hearing the challenge must be capable of ordering the release of the 
detainee129 and should be “independent, objective and impartial in relation to the issues 
dealt with.”130  The “guarantees appropriate” to the detention and detainee in question 
will be entirely dependent on the particular circumstances of the case—“the scope of 
the obligation…is not identical in all circumstances or for every kind of deprivation 
of liberty.”131  Thus, while international law appears to require that detainees would 
be provided with an adversarial procedure132 in which they can participate, (or be 
represented by an advocate),133 the exact format of that procedure will depend on the 
circumstances of the case. 
In times of strain or emergency, international law affords substantive ﬂexibility to
nation states in their detention policies.  That said, however, the international human 
right to challenge the lawfulness of one’s detention would appear not to be subject 
to derogation.134  The non-derogable nature of the right is not expressly outlined in 
any of the primary documents of IHRL, but has rather been implied into the right 
as a result of its fundamentality to the protection of detainees from violations of 
expressly non-derogable and jus cogens rights, such as the protection from torture. 
Thus, while the right to be free from arbitrary detention is subject to derogation in a 
128 Boumar v. Belgium, supra note 126, at ¶ 57.
129 Human Rights Committee, Views of the Human Rights Committee under article 5, paragraph 
4, of the Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, (Shaﬁq
v Australia, Complaint No. 1324/2004), ¶ 7.4, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/88/D/1324/2004 (Nov. 13, 
2006). 
130 Saimijon & Bazaro v. Uzbekistan, ¶ 8.3, Communication No. 959/2000, Views adopted 8 August 
2006, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/87/959/2000; Kulomin v. Hungary, ¶ 11.3, Communication No. 321/
1992, Views adopted 22 March 1996, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/50/D/521/1992. 
131 Boumar v. Belgium, supra note 126, at ¶ 60.
132 Sanchez-Reisse v. Switzerland, 9 Eur. H.R. Rep. 71 (1986).
133 Toth v. Austria, 14 Eur. H.R. Rep. 551 (1991); Human Rights Committee, Views of the Human 
Rights Committee under article 5, paragraph 4, of the Optional Protocol to the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, (Bousroual v Algeria Complaint No. 992/2001), U.N. 
Doc. CCPR/C/86/D/992/2001 (Apr. 24, 2006); Human Rights Committee, Views of the Human 
Rights Committee under the Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights (de Morais v Angola Complaint No. 1128/2002), U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/83/D/1128/2002 (Apr. 
18, 2005). 
134 See supra note 129 and infra note142 and accompanying text.
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time of emergency, the availability of an effective mechanism by which detainees may 
challenge the lawfulness of their detention is an important factor in determining the 
proportionality and lawfulness of the measures introduced.135
In this respect, the United Nations Special Rapporteurs on States of Emergency, 
Torture and a Right to a Fair Trial have reﬂected on the high potential for abuse
where individuals are held incommunicado, and suggested that “habeas corpus 
or other prompt and effective remedy” ought to be non-derogable,136 and the U.N. 
Special Rapporteur on Terrorism and Human Rights has proposed that the Principles 
and Guidelines Concerning Human Rights and Terrorism, currently be drafted, would 
state that “[t]he writs of habeas corpus and amparo may not be denied any person 
arrested and charged for terrorist acts.”137
The HRC has also made it clear that the ICCPR requires that the right to challenge 
the lawfulness of detention through habeas corpus or an equivalent writ would remain 
fully available in times of emergency.  In Alegre v. Peru,138 for example, the HRC 
found that Peru’s Decree Law No. 25659139 violated Article 9(4) of the Convention. 
135 Id.
136 Leandro Despouy, Fourth Annual Report and List of States which, since 1 January 1985, have 
Proclaimed, Extended or Terminated a State of Emergency, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1991/28/
Rev.1, 44-46 (1991); PIETER KOOIJMANS, REPORT BY THE SPECIAL RAPPORTEUR ON TORTURE AND OTHER 
CRUEL, INHUMAN OR DEGRADING TREATMENT OR PUNISHMENT PURSUANT TO HRC RES. 1985/33, U.N. 
Doc. E/CN.4/1986/15, 26-28, 20-25; STANISLAV CHERNICHENKO & WILLIAM TREAT, THIRD REPORT ON 
THE RIGHT TO A FAIR TRIAL: CURRENT RECOGNITION AND MEASURES NECESSARY FOR ITS STRENGTHENING, 
ADDENDUM: RIGHT TO AMPARO, HABEAS CORPUS, AND SIMILAR PROCEDURES, U.N. Doc. E/CN/Sub.2/
1992/24/Add.3, 11; General Recommendations of the Special Rapporteur on Torture, U.N. Doc. 
A/56/156. Indeed, incommunicado detention itself is now becoming accepted as a violation of 
international law—see, e.g., Human Rights Committee, Views of the Human Rights Committee 
under article 5, paragraph 4, of the Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights (El-Megreisi v. Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Complaint No. 440/1990), sec. 5.4, U.N. 
Doc. CCPR/C/50/D/440/1990(Mar, 24, 1994).
137 Working Paper: Preliminary Framework Draft of Principles and Guidelines Concerning Human 
Rights and Terrorism, Principle D.14, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2004/47 (Aug. 11, 2004) 
(prepared by Kalliopi Koufa); see also THE RIGHT TO A FAIR TRIAL: BRIEF REPORT PREPARED BY 
Mr. STANISLAV CHERNICHENCKO AND WILLIAM TREAT IN ACCORDANCE WITH RESOLUTION 1989/27 
OF THE Subcommission UN ESCOR HRC 42nd Session Provisional Agenda Item 10(d), U.N. 
Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1990/34 (1990) recommending the non-derogability of habeas corpus and 
equivalent writs as essential to the effective guarantee of a right to a fair trial. 
138 Human Rights Committee, Views of the Human Rights Committee under article 5, paragraph 4, of 
the Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (Communication 
No. 1126/2002: Peru, Jurisprudence), ¶ 3.3 ¶ 23, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/85/D/1126/2002 (Nov. 25, 
2005).
139 Decree Law 25659, el Peruano, Aug. 12, 1992.
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This law deals with terrorist offenses including high treason, and severely restricts the 
possibility of people held on suspicion of such offenses challenging the lawfulness 
of their detention through habeas corpus petitions.  While the Peruvian government 
argued that this was necessary in order to ensure national security, the HRC found 
that emergencies cannot justify the deprivation of the right to challenge the lawfulness 
of detention.140  This case reﬂects the Committee’s view as to the fundamentality of
judicial controls of detention; they are the recognized means of both avoiding abuses 
and providing an effective remedy to human rights violations.141
In October 1986, the Inter-American Commission of Human Rights submitted a 
request for an advisory opinion from the Court as to whether the judicial protection 
afforded by habeas corpus can be suspended in times of emergency.  The Court held 
that habeas corpus (and amparo) cannot be suspended in times of emergency as these 
judicial protections are essential guarantees to the protection of individual rights 
(including non-derogable rights such as the right to be free from torture) and to the 
“effective exercise of representative democracy.”142  While an emergency situation may 
necessitate a suspension of certain guarantees, the Court stressed that the Rule of Law or 
the principle of legality are never suspended; these continue to be the guiding principles 
for governance even in times of strain.143  Judicial protections are an essential guarantee 
of the application and respect for these principles, and habeas corpus is the means of 
guaranteeing protection from what international law recognizes as the most egregious 
human rights violations (as deﬁned by jus cogens and non-derogable rights).144  These 
140 The U.N. Working Group on Arbitrary Detention reached the same conclusion on this law in 
Eleuterio Zarate Luján v. Peru, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2001/14/Add.1 at 75 (2000). 
141 See generally General Comment No. 29, States of Emergency (Article 4), U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/21/
Rev.1/Add.11, ¶ 16 (Aug 31, 2001); See also Concluding Observations of the Human Rights 
Committee: Israel, ¶ 21 CCPR/C/79/Add.93 (Aug 18, 1998). 
142 Advisory Opinion on Habeas Corpus in Emergency Situations, Inter-American Court of Human 
Rights) 11 Eur. H.R. Rep. 33, ¶ 20 (1987); see also Charter of the Organization of American States, 
art. 3, Dec. 13, 1951,  119 U.N.T.S. 3,; amended by Protocol of Amendment to the Charter of the 
Organization of American States “Protocol of Buenos Aires,” Feb. 27, 1970, 721 U.N.T.S. 324, 
O.A.S. T.S, No. 1-A, ; amended by Protocol of Amendment to the Charter of the Organization of 
American States “Protocol of Cartagena de Indias,” Nov. 16, 1988, O.A.S.T.S, No. 66, reprinted 
in 25 I.L.M. 527, amended by Protocol of Amendments to the Charter of the Organization of 
American States “Protocol of Washington,” Sept. 25, 1997, 1-E Rev. OEA Documentos Oﬁciales
OEA/Ser.A/2 Add. 3 (SEPF), reprinted in 33 I.L.M. 1005; amended by Protocol of Amendment 
to the Charter of the Organization of American States “Protocol of Managua,” Jan. 29, 1996, 1-F 
Rev. OEA Documentos Oﬁciales OEA/Ser.A/2 Add.4 (SEPF), reprinted in 33 I.L.M. 1009.
143 Advisory Opinion on Habeas Corpus in Emergency Situations, supra note 142, ¶ 24.
144 Id.¶¶ 29, 35.
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protections have a particular importance in cases of emergency, when some rights and 
freedoms might be suspended145 and are therefore non-derogable.
In contrast, the European Court of Human Rights has never held that the right to 
challenge the lawfulness of one’s detention, contained in Article 5(4) of the ECHR, 
is non-derogable.  Rather, the Court has consistently taken the continuing availability 
of habeas corpus to suspected terrorist detainees, to be a relevant factor in assessing 
the proportionality of emergency-related periods of protracted detention without 
charge or trial.146  Admittedly, the Court’s reasoning has generally been somewhat 
weak on this matter: as a general principle, the Court merely considered whether or 
not the petition was available to a detainee and did not interrogate the extent to which 
habeas corpus processes would constitute a substantive review of lawfulness in any 
particular circumstance.  That notwithstanding, however, later litigation relating to 
Northern Ireland indicated something of a shift in this respect, with the Strasbourg 
court actually engaging in a deep review of the nature and effectiveness of the habeas 
corpus petition available to suspected terrorists.  Thus, in Fox, Campbell & Hartley 
v. United Kingdom147 the Court noted that not only ought suspected terrorists be in 
a position to challenge the reasonableness of a police ofﬁcer’s belief that he was
involved in terrorist activities, but also that the police ofﬁcer’s belief was not to be
deemed reasonable if based on slender materials, such as prior convictions.  In other 
words, the exigencies of dealing with terrorist crime cannot justify stretching the 
notion of “reasonableness” to the point where the essence of the right to liberty would 
be impaired.148  Fox et al. at least suggests that the European Court of Human Rights 
is concerned not only with the availability of a review, but with the availability of a 
meaningful and adequate review, appropriate to ensuring that the right to liberty is 
not covertly undermined through ineffective review processes.  As a result, it seems 
reasonable to suggest that in a future apposite case, the Strasbourg court might follow 
its international and regional counterparts and elevate Article 5(4) to the status of 
impliedly non-derogable rights. 
145 Id.¶ 40.
146 See, e.g., Ireland v. United Kingdom, 2 Eur. H.R. Rep. 25, ¶ 200 (1979-1980); Brogan & Ors v. 
United Kingdom, 11 Eur. H.R. Rep. 117 (1989); Fox, Campbell & Hartley v. United Kingdom, 
13 Eur. H.R .Rep. 157 (1991); Brannigan & McBride v. United Kingdom, 17 Eur. H.R. Rep. 539 
(1994).
147 Fox, Campbell & Hartley v. United Kingdom, supra note 146; for a concise consideration of the 
case see, e.g., Wilson Finnie, Anti-Terrorist Legislation and the European Convention on Human 
Rights, 54 MODERN L. REV. 288 (1991).
148 Fox, Campbell & Hartley v. United Kingdom, supra note 146, ¶¶ 34-36.
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Thus, IHRL has much to offer domestic legal systems in terms of elucidation 
of the vital component parts of an effective and appropriate review process that 
vindicates the right to be free from arbitrary detention, or the right to liberty.  Counsel 
for the petitioners in Boumediene could certainly have drawn on this rich stream of 
jurisprudence in order to bolster its argument that the CSRT process does not offer an 
“adequate alternative” to habeas corpus.
IV. Understanding the Lack of IHRL Argumentation
The preceding section outlines the rich body of IHRL that remained un-mined by 
counsel for the petitioners in Boumediene in spite of its relevance.  Given the strength 
of international human rights standards for the petitioners’ case, the failure to avail of 
that body of law is worthy of some contemplation.  It can not reasonably be expected 
that counsel for the petitioners were unaware of the law outlined above—after all, 
the extraterritorial application of human rights law and the right to challenge the 
lawfulness of one’s detention have been among the most topical areas of scholarship 
and indeed litigation in the War on Terrorism, particularly in the Superior Courts of 
the United Kingdom.149  It is more reasonable to assume that IHRL was deliberately 
and strategically omitted from arguments for the petitioners.  This part of the Article 
considers two possible explanations for this: ﬁrst, the uncertain status of IHRL in 
municipal US law, and second, the pervasiveness of the view that IHRL is irrelevant 
and indeed inappropriate in the context of the post-9/11 counter-terrorist campaign.
It might be the case that counsel for the petitioners in Boumediene failed to argue 
international human rights norms because of the unfavorable status of these norms in 
the United States.  Once a treaty has been concluded by the President in accordance 
with the requirements of Article II of the Constitution it then becomes the “law of the 
land” by virtue of its inclusion in the Supremacy Clause of Article VI.150  On the one 
149 This is particularly evident in the recent decision of the House of Lords in R (Al-Skeini) v. 
Secretary of State [2007] 3 WLR 33.  For an argument that the House of Lords approach in Al-
Skeini ought to be adopted as a template for future decision making by the U.S. Supreme Court 
see Fiona de Londras, Guantánamo Bay: Towards Legality?, 71 MODERN L. REV. 36 (2008).
150 U.S. Const. art. VI 
 This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; 
and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the authority of the United States, shall 
be the supreme Law of the land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any 
Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.
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hand it is clear that the treaty then binds the United States in its external relations with 
other treaty parties, however what is unclear is what effect, if any, the treaty will have 
on internal law and affairs within the United States.  The United States Constitution 
appears to eschew the traditional classiﬁcations of monist and dualist in relation to
international law,151 and has instead developed its own categorization of treaties which 
then dictates the actions needed for the implementation of treaties in domestic law: 
self-executing and non-self-executing.
This distinction was introduced by Chief Justice Marshall in Foster v. Neilson:
Our constitution declares a treaty to be the law of the land. It is, 
consequently, to be regarded in courts of justice as equivalent to an 
act of the legislature, whenever it operates of itself without the aid 
of any legislative provision. But when the terms of the stipulation 
import a contract, when either of the parties engage to perform 
a particular act, the treaty addresses itself to the political not the 
judicial department; and the legislature must execute the contract 
before it can become a rule for the Court. 152
In other words, if a treaty creates an obligation to carry out a certain act, that 
requires action by a branch of government that holds the constitutional obligation to 
engage in such behavior (e.g. making something a criminal offense), the treaty will 
be seen as non-self-executing and therefore require implementation by Congress.  All 
other treaties will be self-executing and become part of domestic law without any 
Congressional intervention. Importantly, even non-self-executing treaties will bind 
the United States in their relations with other treaty parties; they simply fail to be 
enforceable in the United States courts.  This distinction is expressly accepted in the 
Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law which states that “[c]ourts in the United 
States are bound to give effect to international law and to international agreements of 
the United States, except that a ‘non-self-executing’ agreement will not be given effect 
as law in the absence of necessary implementation.”153  It is now generally accepted 
151 See JOHN F. MURPHY, THE UNITED STATES AND THE RULE OF LAW IN INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS 74-75 
(2004).
152 27 U.S. 253 (1829), at ¶ 254.
153 § 111 (3) (1987).
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that international human rights treaties are never self-executing154 and therefore not 
internally binding on the United States unless they have actually been incorporated 
and, thereby, executed by Congress.  The ratiﬁcation of the ICCPR by the United
States in 1992 was done subject to a Senate declaration that “the provisions of Article 
1 through 27 of the Covenant are not self-executing.”155  Although the Senate stated 
that the declaration was meant to “clarify that the Covenant will not create a private 
cause of action in U.S. Courts,”156 this does not appear to bar reliance on the Covenant 
and jurisprudence of the Human Rights Committee to argue for a contemporary and 
human rights compliant interpretation of the requirements of the U.S. Constitution. 
International human rights norms are not, of course, merely conﬁned to treaty
provisions; they can also take the form of customary international law.  The law of 
the United States has, until recently, accepted almost without question the proposition 
that “[i]nternational law is part of our law, and must be ascertained and administered 
by the courts of justice of appropriate jurisdiction as often as questions of right 
depending upon it are duly presented for their determination.”157  International law, in 
this context, refers to customary international law, which is said to be federal common 
law.158  As a result of the Supreme Court’s long-standing position, that it would apply 
customary international law “where there is no treaty, and no controlling executive 
or legislative act or judicial decision,”159 what is known as the “last in time” rule has 
emerged.  According to this rule, customary international law can be overridden in 
domestic law by a contrary domestic enactment.160 
154 See Louis Henkin, U.S. Ratiﬁcation of Human Rights Conventions: The Ghost of Senator Bricker, 
89 AM. J. INT’L L. 341 (1995).
155 138 Cong. Rec. S4781-84 (1992).
156 S. Exec. Rep., No. 102-23, at 15 (1992). 
157 The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677 (1900), per Gray J., at 700.
158 This position is by no means without controversy or endorsed by all.  See, e.g., Curtis Bradley 
& Jack Goldsmith, Customary International Law as Federal Common Law: A Critique of the 
Modern Position, 110 HARV. L. REV. 815, 850 (1997); Louis Henkin, International Law as Law of 
the United States, 82 MICH. L. REV. 1555, 1556-57 (1984); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN 
RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES, Part I, Chapter 2, introductory note 41 (1987).
159 The Paquete Habana, supra note 157, at 700.
160 The last-in-time rule is hotly contested with most scholars disapproving of its continuing application. 
See, e.g., Carlos Vasquez, Laughing at Treaties, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 2154 (1999); David Sachs, Is 
the 19th Century Doctrine of Treaty Override Good Law for Modern Day Tax Treaties?, 47 TAX 
L. 867 (1994); Jordan Paust, Rediscovering the Relationship Between Congressional Power and 
International Law: Exceptions to the Last in Time Rule and the Primacy of Custom, 28 VA. J. INT’L 
L. 393 (1988). For a rare defense of the rule, see Julian Ku, Treaties as Laws: A Defense of the 
Last-in-Time Rule for Treaties and Federal Statutes, 80 IND. L. J. 319 (2005).
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Given the capacity of the domestic institutions to override international law, it 
may well have been the case that counsel for the petitioners felt they were on more 
secure ground in making primarily constitutional arguments.  That said, however, the 
somewhat insecure status of international law in the United States did not preclude 
reliance on these standards in order to argue that constitutional norms themselves ought 
to be interpreted in a manner that is consistent with, and inﬂuenced by, international
law. Indeed, international standards have frequently played a role in the elucidation 
of contemporary understandings of constitutional standards.  If, as Diane Amann 
has noted, comparative standards are often relied upon by the Supreme Court “when 
circumstances warrant” it,161 the same might be said of IHRL. If such an argument 
by analogy, with reference to comparative law had been made, it would have pointed 
strongly towards consideration of IHRL in this case. 
Amann identiﬁes two important factors in discerning which cases warrant
consideration of and reliance on “external norms”: (1) where these norms have been 
formed through the consideration of analogous questions in analogous circumstances 
to those currently before the law, and (2) where the norms emanate from nations or 
systems that share the United States’ commitment to fundamental rights.  Applying 
these criteria to the current litigation, it becomes clear that there would be nothing 
novel about reliance on external norms, including those emanating from IHRL in the 
current circumstances.  Norms and standards relating to the availability and essential 
features of the right to challenge the lawfulness of one’s detention have been shaped 
in international law through, inter alia, considerations of the operation of this right 
in respect of suspected terrorists and states under threat from terrorist activity.  In 
addition, IHRL not only share a commitment to fundamental rights with the United 
States, but have in fact been substantially shaped by the United States and “illuminate 
[the U.S.’] constitutional values of liberty, equality, property.”162  Thus it would 
have been appropriate and, indeed, in line with constitutional practice, to rely on 
international law in order to enrich, and attempt to shape the meaning and reach of 
constitutional standards in Boumediene.
A further reason for the reluctance to rely on international human rights norms in the 
Boumediene litigation may well lie in an implicit acceptance of the Administration’s 
position that IHRL has no relevance in the context of Guantánamo Bay.  This position 
161 Amann, supra note 5, at 598.
162 LOUIS HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE UNITED STATES 322 (2nd ed. 1996).
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is based on two fundamentally ﬂawed premises: (1) that international humanitarian
law entirely displaces IHRL in times of armed conﬂict as a result of the lex specialis 
rule, and (2) that IHRL is not binding on the United States outside of its own territorial 
borders.  The second of these premises is clearly disproved by the principle that, 
while international human rights norms are usually territorially limited, they can be 
subject to extra-territorial application in exceptional circumstances, including where 
the U.S. has effective control over an area as it does over Guantánamo Bay.  The 
former premise is, however, worthy of more sustained consideration.
While it was originally thought that international humanitarian law and IHRL 
were best seen as completely distinct bodies of law that would not apply in parallel 
to one another, this position has been generally rejected since the 1960s.163  While 
this complementary conception of the relationship between the two bodies of law 
has not displaced the lex specialis rule, it has perhaps changed its nature to a rule 
that recognises that a “more speciﬁc norm … supplements the more general one
without contradiction”;164 that “[t]he lex specialis and the lex generalis then simply 
accumulate.”165  This accumulation of international humanitarian law and human 
rights law has twice been expressly and forcefully asserted by the International Court 
of Justice in its Advisory Opinion on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear 
Weapons166 and Advisory Opinion on the Legal Consequences of the Construction of 
a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory.167  It has also been reiterated by both 
163 For an excellent summary of the original position and the shift to a more complimentary relationship 
between the two bodies of law see Nancie Prud’homme, Lex Specialis: Oversimplifying A More 
Complex and Multifaceted Relationship?, 40 ISR. L. REV. 355, 358-66 (2007).
164 JOOST PAUWELYN, CONFLICT OF NORMS IN PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW: HOW WTO LAW RELATES TO 
OTHER RULES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 410 (2003).
165 Id.
166 The Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. 226 (July 
8) [hereinafter Nuclear Weapons]; for more on this decision see, e.g., JOHN BURROUGHS, THE 
(IL)LEGALITY OF THREAT OR USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS: A GUIDE TO THE HISTORIC OPINION OF THE 
INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE (1997).
167 Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory (Req. for an 
Advisory Opinion) (Dec. 19, 2003), available at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/ﬁles/131/1497.pdf ; for
concise commentary on the decision see, e.g., Susan Breau & Malcolm Evans, Legal Consequences 
of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory: Advisory Opinion, 9 July 
2004, 54 I.C.L.Q.1003 (2005). The decision is frequently critiqued for its shallow consideration of 
international humanitarian law (see, especially, David Kretzmer, The Advisory Opinion: The Light 
Treatment of International Humanitarian Law, 99 AM. J. INT’L L. 88 (2005)) but is nevertheless 
notable in the context of this Article for its reiteration of the principle that international human rights 
law retains its relevance in times of conﬂict.
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the Inter-American Court of Human Rights168 and the European Court of Human 
Rights.169
Thus, while the Supreme Court has recognized the applicability of international 
humanitarian law to the War on Terrorism in Hamdan170 and had, as a result, 
recognized Al Qaeda detainees as rights-bearers under Common Article 3 of the 
Geneva Conventions,171 this did not preclude argumentation from IHRL.  Although 
counsel for the respondent would inevitably have argued that IHRL had no relevance 
in times of armed conﬂict, the petitioners could certainly have constructed a strong
argument for the relevance of IHRL based on the contemporary operation of the lex 
specialis rule. 
The Administration’s position, therefore, ought not to have resulted in the petitioners 
neglecting IHRL completely.  In fact, the decision to all but ignore IHRL, reads as a 
concession to the Administration’s position that domestic law has a monopoly on the 
treatment of Guantanamo Bay detainees.  This decision is lamentable on both practical 
and doctrinal levels.  On a practical level it is to be lamented because the protections 
afforded by an understanding of constitutional standards informed by cotemporary 
international norms arguably affords more secure protection to suspected terrorists. 
On a doctrinal level it is to be lamented because it acquiesces in a view of domestic 
law, as a thing untouched by international standards and understandings of individual 
rights, that is not only antiquated but also out of step with the original conception 
of U.S. law, which seems to have been one of a body of rules receptive to (if not 
168 See, e.g., Abella v Argentina, Inter-Am. C.H.R., Report No. 55/97 OEA/Ser.L/V/II.97, doc. 38 
(1997); Bámaca Velásquez v. Guatemala, Inter-Am. C.H.R., Report No. 37/00 OEA/Ser. C 70 
(2000).
169 See, e.g., Ergi v. Turkey, 33 Eur. H.R. Rep. 2 (2001).
170 Supra note 6.
171 It should be noted that the Supreme Court’s decision that international humanitarian law applies to 
the “War against Al Qaeda” and that Al Qaeda detainees are entitled to the protections of Common 
Article 3 is not without controversy from within the international humanitarian law ﬁeld itself.
For an excellent critical consideration of the decision from this ‘insider’ IHL perspective see 
Fionnuala Ní Aoláin, Hamdan and Common Article 3: Did the Supreme Court Get it Right?, 91 
MINN. L. REV. 1523 (2007).
594 THE ABSENCE OF AN IHRL APPROACH IN BOUMEDIENE & AL ODAH
occasionally in need of) external inﬂuence.172  The exclusion of international law in 
this litigation is intellectually incomprehensible—although Section 5 of the Military 
Commissions Act 2006 expressly prohibits reliance on the Geneva Conventions as a 
source of rights in habeas corpus or other proceedings taken by enemy combatants, 
some minor references to the Conventions are to be found in the argumentation and, 
in any case, the litigation constitutes a challenge to this legislation.  Thus, Section 5 is 
equally insufﬁcient as an explanation for counsel’s decision to side-line IHRL in this
case.  It seems difﬁcult, if not impossible, to read this strategic decision as anything
other than one that indicates a willingness to play out the drama of Guantanamo 
detainees’ rights on the pitch chosen by the administration, rather than to change its 
intellectual location through the injection of contextually relevant international legal 
standards.
V. Conclusion
Although the petitioners in Boumediene constructed strong arguments on the reach of 
the Constitution and the content of habeas corpus based on domestic law, this Article 
172 Critics of the Supreme Court’s intervention in the War on Terrorism frequently cite to the Founders 
in order to support their position that decision in “wartime” ought to be taken by the Executive 
alone, or perhaps sometimes with the compliance of Congress, and that the judiciary ought to 
remove itself from such considerations.  Two major critics of the Hamdan decision (supra note 
6)—John Yoo and Julian Ku—make this and other arguments in John Yoo & Julian Ku, Hamdan 
v Rumsfeld: The Functional Case for Foreign Affairs Deference to the Executive Branch, 23 CON. 
COM 179 (2006).  This argument suffers from many of the same deﬁciencies levelled at originalist
constitutionalism: the world is not the same now as it was when the U.S. constitution was 
introduced—among other things sophisticated international organizations have been developed 
and standards have become constitutionalized within the concept of an international Rule of Law. 
In addition, although the authors are quick to quote from Hamilton and Madison’s contributions to 
THE FEDERALIST PAPERS in this section of their work, they selectively ignore the second half of the 
Madisonian vision of wartime/emergency law making, namely reliance on international standards. 
James Madison argued that the American political branches should abstain from lawmaking in 
times of war and fall back on international standards instead: to his mind stress does not make 
for good law and individual liberties suffer as a result see JAMES MADISON, AN EXAMINATION OF THE 
BRITISH DOCTRINE WHICH SUBJECTS TO CAPTURE A NEUTRAL TRADE NOT OPEN IN TIME OF PEACE (1806). 
The Framers’ intent with which so many commentators are concerned is more complex than it is 
often represented to be: Madison may have advocated judicial restraint in times of emergency or 
war but he did so with an internationalist and temperate political system in mind.  In other words, 
for Madison at least there was only to be judicial restraint if there was accompanying legislative 
and executive restraint.
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shows that IHRL offers persuasive supporting arguments that, if accepted, may well 
have allowed for a broader and more rights-protecting conclusion than reliance on 
domestic law alone.  In addition, such reliance on international law would also have 
offered the Supreme Court an opportunity to make an important statement about 
the relationship between human rights law and the individual liberties protected in 
the U.S. Constitution and the capacity of international standards to enrich domestic 
constitutional standards.  By failing to make the two exceptionally persuasive IHRL 
arguments available to them, counsel for the petitioners in Boumediene missed an 
opportunity to reorient the legal dispute on the habeas corpus entitlements of suspected 
terrorists held in Guantánamo Bay and to afford the justices of the Supreme Court the 
chance to draw conclusions on the continuing relevance of human rights law in a post-
9/11 world analogous to their assertion of international humanitarian law applicability 
in the Hamdan decision. 
